

ALARA for Decommissioning and Site Remediation

Scenarios and strategy for dismantling hot cell M2 at LHMA installation, Mol

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Agenda

- Introduction
- Initial state of hot cell M2
- Strategy and sequences of the dismantling
- Dosimetric results
- Conclusions

The cell M2 was intended to study irradiated fuels

- Forms with Cell M1 (always operational) a group of hot cell
- Put into service in 1977
- Internal volume : 3 m x 3 m x 5 m
- Barium concrete shielding and Pb balls (0,6 à 1 m)
- Liner in stainless steel



- 2 telemanipulators, 3 vertical storage channels
- Travelling crane 3 T. Possible access through the roof (1,6 x 2,1 m)
- In the past: cuts irradiated fuel elements:
 - Turning lathe
 - Milling machine, cutting devices

The initial state of cell M2 was very bad

- From a mechanical point of view:
 - Two existing tables blocked
 - Malfunctions different present devices
 - Waste accumulation
 - La Calhène lock blocked (lock and Pb-shielding)
 - 2 normal ventilations out of duty, emergency ventilation operational
 - Access difficulties
- From a radiological point of view
 - Dose rates from 140 to 180 mGy/h, hot spots up to 4 Gy/h
 - Old experiment in storage 8 Gy/h at 30 cm from shielding
 - Estimated βγ contamination 27,5 GB/dm²
 - 137Cs, le 134Cs, l'154Eu, l'241Am, le 106Ru le 57Co, l'155Eu, le 60Co,...
 - Estimated α contamination 1,88 GBq/dm²
 - ²⁴²Cm, ²³⁸Pu, ²⁴¹Am, ^{239/240}Pu, ...

Manipulators < 15 kg

Jammed portal crane

Broken entry Φ=180mm

Hindering piping of M1

No drain for liquids

Broken small LC locks

Poor lead glass visibility

Clogged HEPA filters

Jammed disconnected tables

Blocked Pb screen

Broken lighting 7/8

Obstructing power supply

Dose rate ceiling 60mGy/h

Historical waste

No access to cell floor

Distortion of back door

Degenerated alpha seals


≠ holes through the walls


Hidden cavities for decon

Oversized mill & lathe

tools Fixed structures

known failures in 2010→ reason for decommissioning M2 failures noticed during decommissioning






Underneath the tables ...

Front working table: jammed and disconnected

Piping adjacent M1 hot cell: hindering passage & quality has to remain



Several dismantling strategies were studied

- Goal of the project
 - Dismantling and decontamination of the inside of the cell
 - Shielding around the cell always operational
 - At the end, reuse HC M2 for new applications
- First studied strategy (before 2010)
 - Decontamination at distance of present pieces (dry ice blasting, no effluents).
 - Transfer decontaminated pieces through opening in roof
 - Cuts by operators of evacuated pieces in an intervention zone to be build above the cell.
 - Strategy applied in the past for the reconditioning of HC 41
 - But: HC 41 smaller and dose levels lower.
 - Difficulties to have a sufficient decontamination.
 - Important dose risks for operators
 - Strategy abandoned

- Restoration functioning support infrastructure
 - La Calhène lock
 - Normal ventilation of the cell
- Cuts at distance of present equipment's
 - Via telemanipulators
 - Development of specific tools

















 Creation of new evacuation ways for big volume wastes (via intervention zone on roof cell)




- ⇒ 143 TBq evacuated in total
- ⇒ Strong later limitation of received doses during the interventions

Evacuation of Moderately Active Wastes (< 200 mGy/h)





- Decontamination at distance
 - Via telemanipulators
 - Surface-active and foaming agent sent at low pressure
 - After ½ h up to 1 h, rinsing with water at low pressure
 - Limited water volume
 - Water gathered in barrel with heating resistors
 - Evaporation water and concentration activity






- Interventions in the cell
 - From background 2 mSv/h
 - Decontamination under high pressure
 - Construction scaffolding to reach the top of the cell
 - Dismantling travelling crane
 - Manual decontamination





Interventions in the cell












The dosimetric impact of the dismantling could be limited

- Global collective Dose 2010–2018
 - 47,169 man.mSv
- Construction intervention zone 2010–2012
 - 1,544 man.mSv
- Cuts and decontamination at distance 2010-2015
 - 0,959 man.mSv
- Use intervention zone of which evacuation wastes 2012-2018
 - 1,963 man.mSv
- Interventions in the cell 2015-2018: 42,703 man.mSv of which
 - Decontamination: 21,526 man.mSv
 - Construction scaffolding: 4,786 man.mSv
 - Dismantling travelling crane: 9,378 man.mSv
 - Several interventions: 7,013 man.mSv
- Maximum Individual Dose on 1 year: 1,861 mSv

The dosimetric impact of the dismantling could be limited

- Collective dose 47,169 man.mSv between 2010 and 2018
- Operations at distance
 - Evacuation majority present activity (143 TBq)
 - Decontamination at distance



- Strong diminution of doses during interventions
- Interventions in cell
 - Deeper decontamination and future reduction of doses
 - Necessity to reach all corners of the cell
 - Collective dose 42,703 man.mSv
 - Ratio Hs(0,07)/Hp(10) from 3 to 5 contamination

Strong β component of the

Conclusions

- The content of cell M2 has been dismantled
- Initial state of the cell very bad
 - From mechanical as radiological point of view
 - Background from 140 to 180 mGy/h, hot spots 4 Gy/h
- ALARA approach
 - Different operations carried out at distance
 - Cuts and evacuation of the content of the cell
 - Decontamination under low pressure via telemanipulators
 - Interventions inside the cell
 - From mean level of 2 mSv/h
 - Decontamination under high pressure
 - Construction scaffolding
 - Dismantling travelling crane
- Collective dose 2010 2018: 47,169 man.mSv

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